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Mapping Aesthetic Development and Epistemological 
Understanding
Jeanne Klein
 
“We see things not as they are but as we are.”1
 
–Anaïs Nin
How do we know? What personal theories of mind do we hold about knowledge 
and knowing in general and theatre in particular? When critiquing performances, 
what sources of artistic knowledge, evidence, and criteria do we rely upon to 
articulate our aesthetic experiences and justify our judgments? If one goal of theatre 
education is to acquire and extend knowledge about human experiences, knowing 
how students and we ourselves think about that knowledge may assist us when 
teaching performance criticism. 
Since the late 1960s, cognitive psychologists have examined how we acquire, 
understand, and construct knowledge as subjective knowers in relation to the 
objectively known world of phenomenal reality. Over time, we construct tacit 
theories about our minds as individual ways of knowing, known as a “personal 
epistemology,” along four main dimensions. These dimensions include our 
perspectives regarding 1) the un/certainty of knowledge, 2) the simplicity and 
complexity of knowledge, 3) our sources of knowledge and evidence, and, 4) our 
assertions, claims, or justifications based on the criteria we employ to test the validity 
of our evidence. Convergent frameworks of personal epistemology are characterized 
by how often we position ourselves in four basic stances as 1) imitative realists, 
2) dualistic absolutists, 3) relativistic multiplists, and 4) critical evaluatists. These 
domain-general perspectives or “stages” of epistemological understanding may 
operate in a spiraling progression of recursion in that we may repeat some traits 
from a previous stage in varying degrees depending on domain-specific tasks in 
situated contexts.2
In the specific domain of visual art, Michael Parsons has proposed a 
developmental framework of aesthetic epistemology that describes how we move 
Jeanne Klein is an Associate Professor of Theatre at the University of Kansas where she teaches courses 
in theatre for young audiences, children and media, and drama with children. Her reception studies with 
child audiences and other articles have been published in the Youth Theatre Journal, Journal of Aesthetic 
Education, Canadian Children’s Literature, and Theatre Research in Canada. An earlier version of this 
essay was presented for the Cognitive Studies working group at the 2008 ASTR conference, Boston.
84                                                               Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
through stages or “sets of ideas” when discussing artworks’ subject matter, artists’ 
expressions, the forms and styles of visual media, and our judgments about each 
of these concepts. Like epistemologists, he marks the boundary of each stage by 
cognitive shifts in: 1) our primary mode of inquiry (i.e., perception, interpretation, 
and evaluation), 2) our expectations about the purposes of art, 3) our primary 
sources of artistic knowledge, and, 4) our primary criteria for making evaluative 
claims. Numerous studies in the visual arts have supported his framework with 
various populations, yet to date no one has offered an analogous epistemological 
framework for the domain of theatre.3
In this paper, I map Parsons’s stages of aesthetic development onto Deanna 
Kuhn’s “steps toward mature epistemological understanding” in order to propose 
a model of theatre epistemology regarding the contexts of performance criticism. 
This model offers a means or “coding” method of analyzing spectators’ critical 
responses to performances to explain how and why they perceive, interpret, and 
evaluate theatrical events. While substantial evidence supports the existence of both 
personal theories of epistemological knowledge and aesthetic ways of knowing 
and judging visual artworks, we have no reception studies with novice and expert 
spectators that document how these four epistemological frameworks might function 
in combination when critiquing theatrical events. Therefore, it remains for future 
reception studies to provide reliable and credible evidence that supports or disproves 
the operative functions of these four stances in whole or in part.4
For example, Introduction to Theatre courses could provide productive sites 
for creating a body of reception studies with novice spectators. Within these 
contexts, instructors could pose specific questions to students regarding their 
epistemological stances when asking them to attend performances and write critical 
essays. They might begin by asking students: What are the purposes of theatre? 
How do you know? What criterial evidence do you use or rely upon to judge 
the artistic effectiveness of performances? Why? Professors could then analyze 
students’ essays and categorize or code their responses according to the respective 
definitions of each epistemological stance.5 Over the course of a semester, they 
could then trace the development or progress students make to see whether and how 
students’ evaluations of performances alter or change as a consequence of guided 
instruction in writing performance criticism. In other words, this formative method 
of reception research would serve as a “measurement” tool of student learning 
in performance criticism. Therefore, until we have an accumulated body of such 
reception evidence, I will suggest further questions professors might ask of their 
students, while offering anecdotal examples of each epistemological stance and 
its possible function in university contexts.
Before describing the characteristics of each epistemological position, it’s 
important to foreground the assumptions underlying the “final end-state” of critical 
argumentation. Like other disciplines, educators in the arts and humanities value 
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and privilege critical thinking—that is, the ability to evaluate and reflect upon one’s 
personal beliefs, to argue for and justify one’s assertions, and to question one’s 
ideological claims based on myriad forms of criterial evidence. This overarching 
educational goal requires that students learn how to coordinate and integrate theories 
and evidence and to synthesize their subjective and objective modes of inquiry using 
both inductive and deductive reasoning.6 When teaching performance criticism, 
this means encouraging students to apply appropriate methodological theories and 
situate the evidence of performances in their historical and contemporary contexts.7 
The following descriptions capture, in brief, the predominate characteristics of each 
epistemological stage toward these ends.
Stage Position One: Realists’ Preferences
From stage one positions, realist spectators believe they may know a 
performance directly and with certainty simply by seeing and hearing the spectacle 
of its visual and aural imagery. Knowing what they like and dislike, they focus 
intuitively on their favorite aspects of the production and use inductive reasoning to 
associate artistic elements and decide whether particular externalized aspects meet 
with their general aesthetic preferences. Emotional experiences with this one “mere 
exposure” satisfy the need to make simple, all-or-none affective decisions about 
a performance’s artistic qualities. With one sensory exposure to a performance, 
neuronal connections are activated in the pleasure areas of our brains so quickly that 
our feelings “tell” us immediately whether we prefer it or not without our having 
to make any cognitive inferences. In other words, affective reactions occur before 
evaluating artistry in consciously cognitive ways.8 
What’s most significant in this stage is that liking or disliking a performance 
means the same thing as evaluating it, even though no such evaluation of its formal 
techniques or artistic intentions occurs. Realists believe that theatre exists and 
functions solely for personal gratification, so the subjective criteria of personal 
preferences are the only necessary factors for “judging” artistic success or failure. 
As Deanna Kuhn explains, “there are no inaccurate renderings of [theatrical] 
events, nor any possibility of conflicting beliefs, because everyone perceives the 
same external reality.”9 Because everyone holds the same perceptual advantage, 
there is no need to think critically about performances or to apply any objective 
criteria for evaluation purposes, as if to say: “It simply doesn’t matter what other 
people think; all that matters is what I think because only I know what I like and 
dislike.” For instance, when selecting plays to produce for university seasons, realist 
decision-makers may reproduce the traditional canon by presuming that students 
need “mere exposure” to others’ experiential preferences.
When instructors ask novice spectators to describe their emotional experiences 
and what they liked and disliked about performances, they inadvertently reinforce 
realist stances. As a consequence, when writing “critical” essays, realists may 
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simply describe their aesthetic “tastes” by repeating their sensory and emotional 
experiences, copied or “imitated” from performances. To move realists beyond 
personally subjective claims, instructors might ask students to answer Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe’s basic questions of criticism when attending performances: 
1) What is each artist (playwright, actors, director, designers) trying to do? 2) How 
well has each artist done it? and 3) Was the performance worth doing?10 Spectators’ 
responses to these questions may further illuminate their epistemological stances 
and suggest particular methods for teaching performance criticism in introductory 
theatre courses. 
Within critical essays, realists may jump ahead to the third question by 
presuming that a production was worth doing because artists already produced it 
and professors required them to attend a performance. Yet the first question requires 
students to infer or speculate upon respective artists’ intentions before they can 
address the success/failure and worthiness of any theatrical event. If students claim 
that artists are merely trying to gratify their own and others’ emotional pleasures, 
they are demonstrating stage one positions. Instead, they need to know and re-
cognize that far more specific artistic intentions beyond personal aesthetic tastes 
initiate, drive, and “cause” aesthetic experiences. Cultural tastes merely reflect 
the by-products or aesthetic “effects” of artists’ intended meanings that result 
from theatrical communication processes. Therefore, when students’ essays move 
beyond statements of emotional experiences and aesthetic preferences to more 
specific inferences concerning artists’ possible intentions, professors may know 
that students have advanced to other epistemological positions.
Stage Position Two: Absolutists’ Criteria of Realism and Moral Beauty
When perceptual attentions shift from identifying preferences to studying the 
subject matter and formal content contained within a performance, spectators move 
into stage two positions by expecting artists to show them what life looks like. 
Perception remains the primary mode of inquiry, and evaluations now derive from 
comparing the external evidence of a performance with the realities of life itself—as 
they have experienced it. For instance, spectators often perceive similarities between 
themselves and actors’ personalities, as expressed within dramatized situations, 
to sense what resonates with them personally.11 Yet only two criteria for making 
comparative judgments need apply—beauty and realism.
Values of aesthetic beauty and verisimilitude in relation to life’s realities have 
been cultivated and normalized by the authorized expertise of theatre and mass 
media producers for generations. Decades of repeated exposure to “beautiful” 
depictions of “real life” have instilled in us an abiding attraction toward, a quiet 
contentedness in, and an unquestioned acceptance of what others favor most in the 
not-for-profit and corporate marketplaces. As Parsons further highlights, no one 
forces us to use these two interrelated factors when judging artworks, but we “accept 
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society’s criteria because they do so faithfully mirror our feelings. Their normative 
power comes from this fact, and was implied in stage one judgments too.”12 We 
now articulate these socially and economically sanctioned values in order to join 
with and belong to the wider aesthetic community by sharing our commonly held 
feelings about “good” and “truthful” performances.
Like neoclassical dictates of dramatic art, the prevailing assumption here is 
that performances are “supposed to” look like life’s realities as readily apparent, 
fully transparent, and faithful representations of the phenomenal world. Rules 
of realism provide an easily accessible and organized structure that anyone can 
comprehend readily for evaluation purposes. Life occurs in a linear, causal chain of 
temporal and spatial events, so dramatic structures are expected to follow similar 
patterns of antecedent causes and consequential effects (e.g., the well-made play). 
Realistic representations capture the most prototypical and familiar style prevalent 
in television and film, especially when sharpened by computerized technologies. 
Familiar situations may be admired for their associated memories and nostalgic 
values (e.g., narrative dramas), while unfamiliar and fantastical situations may offer 
awe-inspiring insights into people, objects, and events we have not experienced 
(e.g., Cats). Knowing how difficult it must be for theatre artists to capture realistic 
details accurately in relation to life’s models, spectators may privilege psychological 
realism over alternative acting styles (e.g., Hamletmachine) and spectacular special 
effects (e.g., Cirque du Soleil) over none at all.
Absolutists judge whether performances are either “good” or “bad” by 
comparing artists’ “correct” or “incorrect” representations and whether they 
are “true to life and believable” or “fake and unbelievable” under the guise of 
“objective” criteria. Conceptualizations of beauty depend on how well artists 
manifest the publically known “essence” of depicted renditions and what may be 
considered “morally good” or socially acceptable dramatizations of life. Attractive 
works are more emotionally satisfying than “ugly” appearances and “offensive” 
content that may dismay, disgust, and disrupt aesthetic pleasures. If a performance 
doesn’t dramatize one’s experiential knowledge of reality and comes across as 
aversive, obscene, and repugnant, then it’s absolutely “bad,” “wrong,” and “false.” 
Aesthetics and morality are often conflated into one “goodness of fit” judgment, 
as many theatre artists know all too well from staging controversial productions 
(e.g., Corpus Christi).
Based on the presumption that representational objects, people, and scenic 
events are far more difficult to render live on stage than non-representational 
subjects on television and film, absolutists praise or criticize formal elements by 
pointing out artists’ successful achievements (e.g., special effects that indicate fire) 
or sloppy “mistakes” (e.g., “fake” props). Either/or thinking patterns also apply 
to judgments concerning a play’s subject matter. For instance, spectators may 
approve of Hamlet as a valued text, but dislike and reject any significant departures 
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from its conventional staging (e.g., cross-gender casting). In reverse, they may 
admire highly realistic stage combat, but dislike Hamlet because they disapprove 
of fighting and violence. Similar dualistic judgments may apply to “beautiful or 
ugly” costumes that evoke positive or negative feelings, and scenic designs may 
be approved or disapproved based on their degrees of distortion from reality. When 
personal judgments between realism and beauty conflict, absolutists choose either 
one or the other criterion and ignore apparent contradictions by concluding that 
judgments about performances all depend on which of the two criteria one happens 
to choose or reverse.
When contending with highly abstract, non-representational productions (e.g., 
Waiting for Godot), absolutists can’t detect potential “mistakes” in comparison 
to reality, so they may grow indignant or confused by non-linear and randomly 
organized dramatic structures, chaotic stage compositions, or verbal “nonsense” 
that any child might just as easily compose. They simply can’t explain why artists 
would purposely dramatize something that no one can make sense of, other than 
just to be “different” and original by performing an absurdist play in order to gain 
attention and win fame. At this stage, “weird, stupid, or boring” performances 
may be attributed to artists’ peculiar and inexplicable “tastes.” For these reasons, 
postmodern performances are often blamed for failing to meet the all-abiding 
criterion of realism. When absolutist spectators can’t make any sensible meaning 
from theatre, the fault lies entirely with artists and the content of their creations.
This commonly held attitude toward non-representational theatre arises from 
spectators’ expectations regarding the utilitarian purposes art is presupposed to 
serve. When people expect theatre to show them life (only as they know it, mind 
you), then it follows that artists hold the sole responsibility for evoking aesthetic 
pleasure. And when artists believe they are solely responsible for ensuring 
spectators’ pleasures, then it follows that their primary mission will be to please 
audiences by giving them what they desire most (e.g., popular culture, such as 
musical theatre). In other words, artists as well as spectators may orient themselves 
from stage two perspectives.
For dualistic absolutists, beauty and realism constitute implicit theories of 
theatre–implicit because spectators and artists rely unconsciously on both inductive 
and deductive reasoning, but without consciously coordinating and integrating these 
two basic modes of knowing. They study the particulars contained within the artistic 
evidence before them in order to arrive at general conclusions or “facts” about its 
objective (and objectionable) subject matter. Having deduced from the general 
world of reality what theatre “ought to” show and look like, they prescribe only 
the particular criteria of moral beauty and schematic realism, without considering 
alternative criteria outside the presumed credibility of authorized and publically 
sanctioned sources.
What’s most significant at this stage is that spectators don’t consider their own 
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roles in the arts equation of aesthetic experience. While perceiving a performance, 
they implicitly ask themselves such questions as, “What is it?” and “What just 
happened?” to make sense of its actualized reality, and “Is it beautiful to me?” 
and “How do I feel about it?” based on immediate affective reactions. As Parsons 
points out, “the answers appear as perceptual facts, as if we have no part in 
constructing them. We do not acknowledge our contribution to the answers, or 
distinguish judgment as a distinct moment within experience.”13 Critical thinking 
remains limited to making perceptual comparisons between the external features of 
performances and other phenomenal realities experienced in life. As Kuhn notes, 
“People can spend entire lifetimes within the protective wraps of either a pre-
absolutist stance in which assertions are equated with reality or, more commonly, the 
absolutist stance in which assertions can conflict but disagreements are resolvable 
by appeal to direct observation or authority.”14
Undergraduate and graduate students often place their faith and trust in 
professors’ assertions without questioning their authorized credibility. Likewise, 
professors may uphold the theories and practices they’ve acquired from mentors and 
academic experts by justifying these sources as the most valid modes of inquiry to 
date, especially when fears of losing one’s status in the academy inhibit conscious 
awareness of absolutist orientations. When professors defer to the majority of 
colleagues who will be most pleased by their choice of experts, the pivotal role 
of the decision maker may not necessarily figure into epistemological equations.
Regardless of personal epistemological stances, methods of questioning 
students during class discussions about performances may potentially spark 
absolutist (and realist) orientations unintentionally. For example, when asked to 
describe their individual experiences of a performance, students may dutifully 
obey by asserting their perceptual comparisons as “objective facts” under the 
guise of personal subjectivity. Knowing that their bodies lie outside and separate 
from the performance “objects” on stage, they may assume Kant’s stance of 
“disinterestedness” by distancing themselves from any personally relevant 
conceptual metaphors that do not affect their lives directly.15 Making students aware 
of their unconsciously held sources of knowledge and their constrained criteria for 
understanding a theatrical event may move them to the next epistemological stage.
Stage Position Three: Multiplists’ Opinions about Artists’ Expressed Intentions
Spectators travel to stage three positions when they consciously recognize their 
own interpretative roles in generating aesthetic judgments as socially constructed 
transactions between themselves and artists’ subjectivities. Expected purposes of 
theatre shift from identifying realistic beauty and moral norms to examining artists’ 
expressed intentions (Goethe’s first question) based on the evidence of their crafted 
abilities to achieve their own emotionally embodied experiences with genuine 
intensity.16 Spectators may speculate about artists’ intentions and motives in order 
90                                                               Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism
to explain why a performance was produced in the first place. Knowing one’s 
own aesthetic sensibilities and privately held thoughts and feelings allows for a 
corresponding appreciation of artists’ intentions, as spectators now consider their 
subjective opinions in relation to artists’ “self-evident” reasons for deciding upon 
dramatic genres and theatrical styles. They know (consciously or unconsciously) 
that “aesthetics has always harbored an uneasy tension between the necessity of 
critical standards for judging art works and the fact that those standards rely upon 
the subjective responses of the individuals appreciating art, which are notoriously 
variable,” as Carolyn Korsmeyer affirms.17 So at this stage, they interpret and judge 
the myriad forms of evidence contained in theatrical events by applying “objective” 
criteria as deduced and prescribed by theatre experts’ socially established norms 
and critical theories.
However, at this relativist or multiplist stage, regardless of whether one agrees 
with particular artistic choices, value judgments have to do with respecting artists’ 
individual rights of expressing their subjective experiences. Relativistic spectators 
believe that everyone is entitled to his or her own forms of self-expression and 
that no one person can judge whether artistic expressions are “right or wrong” or 
“true or false.” Each person’s preferential tastes and subjective opinions of artistic 
success or failure are equally “right” and “truthful” because individual critics also 
have the democratic right to express their multiple interpretations and naturally 
divergent opinions. Aesthetic judgments based on any one person’s definitions of 
subjectively derived criteria are simply irrelevant, so again no critical thinking need 
be involved. As Mark Felton and Deanna Kuhn observe in regard to museums, 
simply exposing visitors to controversial exhibits (e.g., evolution) often fails to 
provoke multiplists and absolutists into making further inquiries and questioning 
how they know what they know about the arts, sciences, and history.18 “Whatever” 
may be heard as a common response when apathetic spectators don’t really care 
whose opinion “wins or loses.” In classroom discussions, silent students know 
that professors’ opinions will ultimately win out anyway regardless of their own 
contrarian viewpoints.
Yet when personal judgments about a controversial performance differ wildly 
(e.g., Oleanna), people passionate about their interpretations may use critical 
thinking to dismantle others’ claims—if they believe that engaging in a protracted 
debate is worth the cognitive effort with substantial educational payoffs. To win an 
argument with absolutists, multiplists may take them through their critical theories 
and procedural methods used to verify complex claims by relying upon other theatre 
critics’ criteria. To support personal justifications, negotiated debates then revolve 
around “objective” examinations of artistic evidence discerned from a performance’s 
formal elements and technical qualities (e.g., its structure, staging, acting, and 
scenography). For instance, by appealing to artists’ and critics’ constructs of stylistic 
classifications defined within historical and contemporary contexts, multiplists 
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may argue on behalf of respective authors’ mutually complex, ambiguous, and 
even paradoxical meanings that might render any given performance significant, 
valuable, and worthwhile to public audiences.
To these ends, relativists may select artistic evidence from a production 
that already fits with others’ established theories. They may justify counter 
interpretations by noting alternative theories that substitute different evidence. 
In other words, multiplists’ selections of theories, methods, and evidence are 
relative to whatever rules of inquiry have been instituted for scholarly debates in 
classrooms, at conferences, and across academic journals. Yet whatever mode of 
hermeneutic and phenomenological inquiry one chooses, any empirically derived 
evidence examined from socially constructed criteria constitutes elusive signs and 
slippery symbols of “proof”—burdens of which that appear (to me) to accentuate 
the circular conundrums of postmodern relativity, as Noël Carroll argues at length.19
In cases where absolutists refuse to accept and believe any evidence that 
does not compare favorably with their preferred theories (and their delusions of 
winning arguments), unsettled debates must inevitably come to a close for purposes 
of peaceful coexistence. In the end, people simply agree to disagree by voting 
democratically to decide whose opinions and self-justifications will win and lose. In 
regional and national cases where multiplists disagree on the artistic effectiveness 
and worthiness of performances, the winning view will depend on which set of 
critics—the theatre experts or the general public—holds the most persuasive power 
and cultural capital. When push comes to shove, public audiences’ opinions and 
their consumer dollars may matter more than regional and national critics’ awards 
for theatrical excellence in respective market economies.20
The pivotal problem that multiplists face is that they may not actually know 
artists’ context-specific intentions embedded within playwrights’ works and 
the planning, rehearsal, and technical circumstances that resulted in production 
choices. Even when critics speculate appropriately on artists’ possible or probable 
meanings, artists themselves may report that they intended no such interpretations. 
For example, a highly respected scholar wrote an insightful essay concerning the 
compelling implications that arose from casting an African American actor in 
a postmodern performance—only to find out later from company members that 
this actor was cast simply because she was the most talented person available 
for the role. This critic’s interpretations of the performance were not necessarily 
“false” or “misguided” but simply “inaccurate” in the sense that she did not have 
complete knowledge about all of the contexts surrounding the making of this 
production. While inquisitive interpretations often provide persuasive viewpoints 
on meaningful metaphors that apply to broader sociocultural contexts, another 
epistemological stance remains for fruitful consideration.
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Stage Position Four: Reflective Critics’ Cultural Responsibilities
When we begin to doubt and question the very foundations upon which our 
entire history of personal epistemology has been fabricated, we move to a far 
more self-reflective and autonomous stance of individual agency that consciously 
recognizes our greater social and empathetic responsibilities to global cultures at 
large. Questioning the fabric of our epistemological tapestries allows us to push 
scholarly inquiry and argumentation forward to newly imagined territories of 
unsettled investigations. At this end-stage of aesthetic reasoning, we may revel 
in culturally shaped concepts more firmly revealed to us as symbolically laden 
metaphors created by our own embodied minds.21 When substantiating our plausible 
claims, we challenge existing theories for failing to account for available evidence, 
evaluate the explanatory power of our interpretations, consider the possible 
contingencies and potential consequences of our own and others’ judgments, 
and humbly admit our human limitations and the ever-present risks of drawing 
erroneous conclusions.
Our criticisms of any theatrical event widen considerably as we consciously 
judge ourselves as both the subjects and objects of our systemized inquiries 
within academic institutions. By fully integrating both subjective and objective 
perspectives, we now question the very artistic criteria formulated by past and 
present critical and cultural theorists. As anthropologist Dorothy Washburn makes 
clear in her cross-cultural investigations of “aesthetic universals,” “In the West, art 
critics dictate aesthetic criteria. But among people in societies such as the Hopi, 
everyone knows the principles and practices that lead to a perfect life and strives 
to live by them because the well-being of the community depends on everyone’s 
participation” (her emphasis).22 Likewise, in her fancifully titled book, Homo 
Aestheticus, Ellen Dissanayake explains why we participate in our own and others’ 
arts creations: to make our ordinary lives extraordinary and awe-inspiring. When 
we care deeply about our collective humanities, we symbolize and preserve our 
embodied experiences in the hope of shaping others’, just as we have been changed 
by our most memorable aesthetic experiences. The fact that others may question 
and fail to value what we define as an “arts experience” for ourselves should not 
matter–if we can agree that, regardless of culture and contexts, human beings are 
far more alike than different.23
Questioning Epistemological Positions
From a critical evaluatist stance, how do we approach students’ self-prescribed 
definitions and the culture-specific criteria they employ when judging the personal 
efficacy of their socially transacted theatre experiences? To what extent do we 
grant them the same agency as ourselves to argue, defend, and support their own 
self-reflective criticism in socially responsible classroom communities? Having 
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wrestled with context-specific evidence, to what extent do we encourage them to 
question the very theories of performance criticism and time-tested practices of 
argumentation upon which we stand? If we expect any theatrical event to raise 
provocative questions and metaphoric truths about human lives, what “answers” 
may best satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of established rules of 
critical argumentation–beyond personal affirmations of what we already know and 
understand about theatre and life? I do not know.
I do know that these four epistemological perspectives represent gradational 
levels of education, as may have become apparent from my brief sketches. Cognitive 
developmental studies find that stage one captures preschoolers’ stances, stage two 
characterizes most elementary students, and stage three personifies most high school 
and college students. Most striking is that the majority of adults continue to operate 
from absolutist and multiplist orientations, and very few reach the evaluatist level 
of epistemological understanding as skeptical critics.24 Instead, this end-state is 
most often characterized by those who hold doctoral degrees—university educators 
who initially promote and privilege critical argumentation in the first place! These 
self-constructed findings raise innumerable questions and troubling implications 
in regard to prejudicial charges against “intellectual elitism.”
To address this quandary, educational psychologists recommend more 
explicit approaches to critical thinking and argumentation by confronting students 
with epistemic doubts about their embodied beliefs in order to create cognitive 
dissonance. If students were to question routinely authoritative theories and 
published evidence and constantly develop argumentation skills, then perhaps 
more might appreciate and engage in the dramatic thrill of negotiating conflicts—if 
they are willing to move beyond debilitating fears of losing faith in their current 
epistemological orientations. Likewise, we ourselves need the courage to question 
our own pedagogical assumptions and ideological beliefs, especially when 
critical theories and successful methods appear to be working to our evaluatists’ 
satisfaction.25 While it is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest further methods 
for teaching performance criticism, knowing students’ implicit and explicit 
epistemological orientations as theatre spectators holds promise for challenging and 
extending critical argumentation skills among undergraduate and graduate students.
Finally, from a more radical evaluatist perspective, I would like to raise just 
a few “unsettling” questions concerning my contrarian criticisms of postmodern 
theorizing. As Henry Bial writes, the field of performance studies “is for the people 
who like not knowing, who find the uncertainty of unmapped terrain exhilarating. . 
. .The positive promise of performance studies—its potential to illuminate, instruct, 
and inspire–is enhanced, not diminished, by this ever-present uncertainty” (his 
emphasis).26 Now I admit that I still carry some unshakeable realist and absolutist 
tendencies, but I like knowing, with at least some ounce of certainty, potential 
answers to burning questions across variable-dependent contexts. My realist-driven 
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mappings here obviously reproduce others’ models (with a preference for quoting 
Kuhn’s claims) to offer, what I hope, are some plausible “truths” about spectators’ 
personal epistemologies during their engagements with performance criticism. And 
while I acknowledge the pitfalls of binary thinking habits, I still wonder why we 
have two-sided brains if not to allow us to reason inductively and deductively about 
dueling dualisms and dialectical debates so we may extract conditional balances 
between two contrasting extremes within and outside competing theories.
From multiplist and evaluatist stances, while I affirm that skeptical critics 
own the democratic right to express their rejections of cognitive psychology, what 
are the consequences of not integrating the epistemological and neuroscientific 
evidence of spectators’ minds with idolized theories? As David Krasner and David 
Saltz point out,
the validity of performance theories ultimately rises or falls 
on arguments proffered by the theorists upon which the theory 
draws, rather than on the theorists’ own argument. The shape of 
this type of argument is conditional: if we accept the arguments 
of [a preferred theorist], then certain ideas about theater or 
performance follow accordingly. One result of this approach to 
theory is that the sequence of theoretical discourse about theater 
and performance flows almost exclusively from elsewhere and 
into performance theory, and only occasionally does it flow out 
again to influence other disciplines.27
Admittedly, my proposed model of theatre epistemology flows from cognitive 
developmental psychology into performance criticism by offering another 
investigative and pedagogical means of understanding spectators’ personal theories 
of knowledge and knowing performances. In order to reverse this flow back to 
cognitive disciplines, theatre researchers need to conduct reception studies with 
present-day spectators by gathering and analyzing their perceptions, interpretations, 
and criticisms of various theatrical events.28 By documenting, sharing, and debating 
the evidence of spectators’ epistemological positions and weighing this accumulated 
evidence against a myriad number of existing theories, we may explain why only 
9% of US spectators (or 21 million people) attend live theatre annually and only 4% 
read plays for leisure.29 While invariably complex and interdependent reasons most 
likely account for these low and still decreasing theatre attendance figures (e.g., 
competing mass media technologies), the evidence of these national conditions also 
suggests consequential mismatches between theatre producers’ artistic intentions 
and spectators’ epistemological expectations.
Yet such studies will not happen unless and until more self-reflective critics 
in stage four positions question the consequential values of current performance 
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theories and release their understandable fears and anxieties over cognitive theories 
and empirical methods of qualitative research.30 As Howard Gardner surmises, 
changing people’s minds and their epistemological orientations requires reasoned 
research that will resonate emotionally against their resistant beliefs concerning 
explanatory representations of real spectators with compelling rewards.31 While 
such a research agenda obviously necessitates a retooling of training in cognitive 
science, skeptical critics still need to doubt and question ongoing integrations 
of multifarious social-cognitive and affective theories with a growing body of 
neurological evidence. For instance, if our mirror neurons enable empathetic 
tendencies, not only for human survival, but for the survival of live theatre, what 
would happen to performance criticism if critical thinking strategies were displaced 
as the end-state of personal epistemology in favor of more emotionally resonant 
and less cognitively resistant appeals of persuasion? How might we characterize a 
potential “fifth” stage of theatre epistemology that captures peaceful reconciliations 
and theoretical coordinations with cognitive and neuroscientific disciplines beyond 
argumentative debates contested solely within and among the circles of theatre and 
performance studies? I look forward to exploring further epistemological avenues of 
theatre spectatorship, especially those migrations that move us beyond the mapped 
terrains of performance practices, dramatic literature, and theatre historiography 
toward hopeful (and utopic) reconciliations with personal theories of mind.
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